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A B S T R A C T   
This paper answers recent calls to give more attention to the business strategies of incumbent 
actors regarding innovation and socio-technical transitions. We map the solar business model 
adoption of 30 Swedish electric utility incumbents and examine to what extent it can be explained 
by the strategic fit with the utilities’ established business models, corporate strategies, and 
external environment. We find that all three dimensions need to be considered in order to explain 
adoption. Alignment with the established business model is mainly important concerning activ-
ities, resources, and partnerships, and utilities also re-configure solar models to increase this 
alignment (e.g. through outsourcing). However, it is not the main driver for adoption. Instead, 
incentives and pressures related to corporate strategies and external environment induce or block 
utilities from adopting solar models. By demonstrating the importance of strategic fit, these 
findings provide a more nuanced understanding of industry incumbent’s strategies in relation to 
emerging technologies.   
1. Introduction 
The last few decades have seen an increasing literature on innovation and socio-technical transitions in important societal sectors 
such as energy and transport. The importance of considering the strategies and actions of different types of actors in such processes is 
generally acknowledged (cf. Farla et al., 2012; Rosenbloom et al., 2016; Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
This applies not the least to incumbent companies, for which emerging technologies can be opportunities as well as threats 
(Galeano Galvan et al., 2020). Indeed, although much of the innovation and transitions literature expects incumbents to be concerned 
mainly with incremental and continuous innovation (Cherp et al., 2017; Geels, 2018; Winskel et al., 2014), recent literature has shown 
that established actors sometimes change strategic direction and reorient themselves to take an active part in developing more radical 
emerging innovations (Berggren et al., 2015; Cozzolino and Rothaermel, 2018; Geels et al., 2016). This has resulted in calls to give 
more attention to incumbent actors and their varying roles and strategies regarding new technologies (Ampe et al., 2021; Blanchet, 
2015; Geels, 2018; Onufrey and Bergek, 2020; Turnheim and Sovacool, 2020; van Mossel et al., 2018). The overall aim of this paper is 
to contribute to this line of inquiry. 
Previous literature distinguishes between institutional and techno-economic strategies (cf., e.g. Geels, 2014b; Smink et al., 2015; 
Turnheim and Sovacool, 2020) In brief, the former refers to strategies directed at the institutional environment, including efforts to 
create, maintain or disrupt political, cultural or normative institutions (Galeano Galvan et al., 2020), whereas the latter refers to 
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strategies directed at the economic (or task) environment (e.g. technology and business strategies). So far, much research on the 
strategies of incumbents in large sectors such as energy and transport has focused on institutional strategies (Bakker, 2010; Geels and 
Verhees, 2011; Rosenbloom et al., 2016) or technology strategies (Budde et al., 2012; Magnusson and Berggren, 2011). In contrast, the 
focus of this paper is on business strategies. This is in line with suggestions by Geels (2018) to address the business dimensions of 
incumbent strategies in order to contribute to a more symmetric understanding of interactions between emerging innovations and 
established actors and structures (cf. also Penna and Geels, 2012). 
The empirical focus of the paper is the electricity sector, where incumbent electric utilities are facing increasing competition from 
decentralized electricity generation by prosumers and other new entrants (Apajalahti et al., 2018) as well as various pressures to move 
their existing business in a more sustainable direction (Lempiälä et al., 2019). In response, they are increasingly engaging with ‘new’ 
renewables (Bergek et al., 2013; Johnstone and Kivimaa, 2018; Wassermann et al., 2015). Our specific focus is solar photovoltaics 
(PV), where a number of different business models have been identified in previous literature (Horváth and Szabó, 2018). This can be 
seen as business model innovation in the form of diversification (Geissdoerfer et al., 2018). 
However, previous studies of energy incumbents’ business strategies with regard to energy innovation rarely go beyond describing 
their investments in own generation capacity (cf., e.g., Kattirtzi et al., 2021; Kungl and Geels, 2018; Mori, 2021). This means that other 
possible business models within the “business model design space” (Huijben et al., 2016), are largely overlooked. Moreover, it is far 
from clear why incumbents prefer certain models over others. While it seems reasonable to assume that electric utilities would prefer 
solar models that can be integrated with their existing strategies (cf. Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016), no 
empirical study has so far been conducted to confirm (or reject) this assumption. 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to identify and explore potential explanations for the business strategies of electric utility 
incumbents in relation to solar PV technology. More specifically, the paper maps the solar business models adopted by the 30 largest 
electric utilities in Sweden and analyses to what extent these models strategically fit, i.e. are aligned with the incumbents’ existing 
business, corporate strategies, and external environment in order to answer two research questions: 
RQ1: What characterises the solar business model adoption pattern of Swedish electric utility incumbents? 
RQ2: To what extent can strategic fit explain the adoption pattern? 
2. Analytical framework 
2.1. Business models for solar PV 
Our first research question concerns the adoption of different solar business models by established electric utilities. Most often, a 
business model describes how a specific organization creates, delivers and captures value (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). This can be 
defined at the level of the entire organization or for individual business units, depending on the company’s degree of diversification 
and the coherence between its different businesses. However, a business model can also describe a more generic setup for creating and 
capturing value from an emerging technology, which does not necessarily coincide with the borders of a particular firm (cf. Zott et al., 
2011). This implies, on the one hand, that an entire “ecosystem” of different collaborating partners might be needed to realize a 
particular business model (Adner, 2017). On the other hand, the same basic business model can be adopted by several different firms 
engaged in the same technology, resulting in one or more dominant overall business model(s) at the industry level. 
When a new technology emerges, companies need to develop appropriate business models in order to realize its potential value 
(Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016) and make the innovation competitive in main-
stream markets (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Huijben et al., 2016; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). However, there are normally large 
uncertainties with regard to what an appropriate business model is for a new technology. Before the emerging technology becomes 
institutionalized and develops its own dominant industry logic (Smith et al., 2005), actors – new entrants as well as incumbents – 
therefore tend to experiment with a range of different business models (Hess, 2016; Huijben et al., 2016; Huijben and Verbong, 2013). 
Fig. 1. PV business model archetypes (own illustration based on a review of previous literature).  
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This is also the case for solar PV, where earlier studies show that a number of different solar models have been explored by different 
types of actors (for a review, see Horváth and Szabó, 2018). 
Based on such studies, a number of different ‘archetypical’ solar PV models have been identified and categorized based mainly on 
the physical location of the PV system and how the electricity is sold and used (e.g. Burger and Luke, 2017; Horváth and Szabó, 2018). 
Broadly, the literature distinguishes between utility-side models (in which the PV system is located on the utility side of the electricity 
meter, usually as a centralised ‘solar park’) and customer-side models (in which the PV system is located on the user side of the 
electricity meter, usually as a rooftop application) (Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). These can be further divided into sub-categories 
(see Fig. 1). 
On the utility side, two main solar model archetypes can be identfied. In the ‘utility ownership’ model, utilities own PV plants and 
sell the generated electricity to their customers either on the general electricity market (‘wholesale’) or under long-term contracts to a 
particular buyer (‘power purchase agreement’) (Burger and Luke, 2017). In the ‘community solar’ model, customers buy shares in solar 
parks, while the park is built and operated by either a utility or another organization like a cooperative or non-profit organization 
(Chan et al., 2017). This allows actors to invest in solar PV even if they cannot have a PV system installed on their premises (e.g. if they 
live in an apartment or have a shaded roof) (Burger and Luke, 2017; Horváth and Szabó, 2018; Huijben and Verbong, 2013). 
The customer side can also be divided into two solar model archetypes. In ‘host-ownership’ models, the customer purchases and 
owns a PV system (Horváth and Szabó, 2018). This contrasts with ‘third-party ownership’ models, where the customer does not own 
the PV system even though it is located on their premises; instead, someone else (a ‘third party’) owns the system and takes care of the 
upfront costs, operation, maintenance etc., while the customer either leases the systems or purchases the generated electricity through 
a power purchase agreement (Drury et al., 2012; Overholm, 2015). 
Electric utilities can, theoretically, be involved in all these models – through owning plants, building and operating community 
solar parks, acting as a third-party owner, or providing turnkey plants in a host ownership model – and so far, there is limited empirical 
evidence to suggest that incumbents prefer any one of them over the others. Roughly ten years ago, Schoettl and Lehmann-Ortega 
(2011) attempted to estimate the popularity of solar models for electric utilities. However, their study was conducted in an early phase 
of PV diffusion when little empirical evidence was available. After ten years of further development and use of different solar models, 
our study is based on empirical data on actual adoption. 
2.2. The importance of strategic fit 
Our second research question concerns the strategic fit of different solar models from the point of view of established electric 
utilities. The strategic management literature emphasizes the importance of different types of strategic fit (or alignment) for orga-
nizational decisions and performance. Such fit can be assessed from an internal or external point of view (Wadström, 2019). Internal fit 
refers to alignment between strategies and goals at different levels and functions within an organization. It includes both vertical 
alignment between strategies at different organizational levels (Kathuria et al., 2007) and horizontal alignment between different 
functional or business units within an organization (Wadström, 2019). External (or environmental) alignment highlights the impor-
tance of matching the company’s strategies and resources to its environment (Kathuria et al., 2007; Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). 
2.2.1. Horizontal alignment 
In this paper, horizontal alignment refers to the strategic fit between a new business versus one or more established businesses (e.g. 
host ownership versus electricity retailing). Niche innovations can, for example, be more or less aligned with existing business models 
in terms of value proposition (Bolton and Hannon, 2016), distribution channels (Geels, 2010), key resources and complementary assets 
(Smith et al., 2005; Verbong and Geels, 2007; Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008), key partnerships (Apajalahti et al., 2018), and profit 
margins or return on investment (Geels, 2018; Huijben and Verbong, 2013; Kungl, 2015). 
In general, it seems reasonable to assume that incumbents are more likely to pursue niche innovations that have a high degree of 
alignment with their established business model(s) (Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014; Wassermann 
et al., 2015). These are easier to recognize (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Geels, 2018) and do not require any radical reconfiguration of 
existing value creation and capture processes and networks (Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). Moreover, a high degree of horizontal 
alignment makes it possible to exploit synergies between different “sibling” businesses (Wadström, 2019). Some scholars have sug-
gested that alignment in terms of value proposition, customer interface and downstream complementary assets is especially important 
for incumbents (Apajalahti et al., 2018; Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), but so far little empirical evidence has 
been presented to support this suggestion. 
Regarding solar PV, it has been argued that it does not fit very well with the incumbent electric utility business model, which is 
focused on large-scale, centralized production and/or sales of electricity as a commodity (Huijben and Verbong, 2013; Rosenbloom 
and Meadowcroft, 2014). However, while this might explain the general reluctance or willingness of electric utility incumbents to 
engage with solar PV as such, it does not necessarily explain their choices of which specific solar models to adopt. Some have suggested 
that incumbents would be more likely to adopt utility-side models (Ruggiero and Lehkonen, 2017) since these are more similar to their 
traditional way of working (Funkhouser et al., 2015; Richter, 2013), while customer-side models might erode their current business 
(Bryant et al., 2018; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). For example, Schoettl and Lehmann-Ortega (2011) identify six generic solar 
models, resulting in recommendations for adoption based on their respective ‘distance’ to the established business model. They argue 
that utility-side models are more favorable given electric utilities’ core competencies, but do not provide empirical evidence to support 
this recommendation. 
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2.2.2. Vertical alignment 
In this context, vertical alignment refers to fit between, on the one hand, business unit strategies or individual business models (in 
this case different solar business models) and, on the other hand, the organization’s overall strategy at the corporate level (Wadström, 
2019). The latter includes corporate-level goals and objectives (Cornelius du Preez and Folinas, 2019) as well as the company’s 
business scope and overall strategic orientation (Fainshmidt et al., 2019; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1999; Lin et al., 2019). 
Whereas business models are designed to create and capture value in a particular product market, corporate strategy is concerned with 
providing an overall sense of direction for business-level strategies to be designed and implemented in a consistent way (Kathuria et al., 
2007). It also aims at coordinating and prioritizing between different businesses within the company (Bowman and Helfat, 2001) in 
order to manage and control shared resources and make sure that all businesses contribute to “the good” of the organization 
(Wadström, 2019). 
Although previous literature does not present much evidence of this, it seems reasonable to assume that corporate-level goals and 
activities might influence which solar models incumbent electric utilities engage with. For example, previous studies suggest that some 
incumbents offer their customers the chance to invest in solar PV (through rooftop installation or community solar) mainly to retain 
and improve the relationships with their existing customer base (Funkhouser et al., 2015; Huijben and Verbong, 2013). This implies 
that differences between energy companies with regard to corporate goals and strategies might lead to differences in adoption patterns 
between incumbents. 
2.2.3. Environmental alignment 
Environmental alignment refers to the alignment between an organization’s strategies, resources, structures and processes and its 
environment (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Wadström, 2019). This includes both the task environment and the institutional 
environment (Scott, 1992). The task environment comprises external factors that are relevant for the activities firms perform to 
achieve their organizational goals (Scott, 1992). It includes actors such as, for example, a company’s customers, suppliers, competitors, 
and regulatory groups (Carroll and Huo, 1986). The institutional environment includes regulatory, normative and cognitive rules 
(Scott, 1992) which can be general to the exogenous socio-political landscape or specific (and partly endogenous) to the industry a 
company belongs to (Geels, 2014a). 
The task environment could be expected to be particularly important for companies’ choices of business models for emerging 
technologies as it is more directly related to value creation and capture than the institutional environment (cf. Carroll and Huo, 1986). 
Regarding solar PV, previous studies have, for example, found that different types of adopters prefer different models, for example 
depending on their ability and willingness to pay a large upfront cost (Overholm, 2015; Strupeit and Palm, 2016) or their risk pro-
pensity (Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017), and that pre-existing industrial configurations can influence which models are devel-
oped and adopted (Strupeit and Palm, 2016). However, there is also some evidence that utilities that engage in community solar, 
third-party ownership or host ownership models are partly driven by a wish to gain political goodwill (Richter, 2013). In addition, 
technology-specific regulations and subsidies have been shown to influence which solar models are adopted in a country or region 
(Burger and Luke, 2017; Huijben et al., 2016; Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017; Overholm, 2015; Strupeit and Palm, 2016). 
2.2.4. Framework for analysing strategic fit 
To sum up, this paper is concerned with the importance of strategic fit between different solar models and the incumbents’ 
Fig. 2. Strategic fit dimensions considered in this paper (own illustration).  
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established business model, which can be broken down into horizontal, vertical, and environmental alignment (see Fig. 2). In our 
empirical analysis, we will assess the degree of fit between different solar models and (1) the established electric utility business model, 
(2) the corporate-level strategies of electric utilities, and (3) their external environment. The results of each of these analyses will be 
compared with the identified adoption pattern in order to determine the importance of horizontal, vertical, and environmental 
alignment – individually and together – for incumbents’ adoption of different solar business models. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. The Swedish electricity sector and solar PV 
Concerning business model design for solar PV, one size rarely fits all geographical contexts, solar business models rather need to be 
translated from one context to another (Ahlgren Ode and Lagerstedt Wadin, 2019). Although a certain business model archetype can 
often be found in several countries, the degree to which it succeeds, as well as details in its design, might differ between countries or 
regions depending on various local factors (e.g. Strupeit and Palm, 2016). This implies that study context variety is favourable to 
understanding business model adoption and, we would add, energy innovation and sustainability transitions in general. The Swedish 
case would be a relevant contribution to extending the empirical base. 
Sweden differs in a central aspect from many other countries, as its electricity production is almost entirely fossil-free. It is based 
mainly on large-scale hydro and nuclear power, with smaller shares of biomass-based cogeneration plants and wind power. Thus, 
Swedish electric utilities are not necessarily subjected to the same landscape pressures and threats from sustainable niche innovations 
as incumbents in fossil fuel-based regimes (Geels, 2014b; Kattirtzi et al., 2021; Kungl and Geels, 2018; Lee and Hess, 2019; Winfield 
et al., 2018). Nevertheless, Swedish electric utilities are still facing destabilization of the established socio-technical regime of baseload 
generation (Johnstone and Kivimaa, 2018; Lee and Hess, 2019). Specifically, Swedish utilities face a decommissioning of all nuclear 
power plants by 2040 (Svenska Kraftnät, 2017). In contrast to the politically steered nuclear phase-out in Germany, Swedish nuclear 
plants are facing unfavourable economic conditions and approaching the end of their technical life. 
Although Sweden is not among the top countries when it comes to installed solar PV capacity, the Swedish market for distributed 
PV is larger than the global average in per capita terms (Palm and Lantz, 2020) and is expected to grow sevenfold in the coming 20 
years (Svenska Kraftnät, 2017). While this market has historically been dominated by specialized solar installation firms, electric 
utilities have been entering the market since around 2010 and this trend is increasing (Lindahl et al., 2020). 
3.2. Selection of companies 
So far, we have been referring to ‘incumbents’ and ‘electric utilities’ interchangeably. However, these two terms are neither exact 
synonyms, nor unambiguous. Indeed, the concept of ‘industry incumbent’ is defined and interpreted in different ways in different parts 
of the literature. Some authors associate incumbency with power and influence over markets and institutions (cf. Apajalahti et al., 
2018; Galeano Galvan et al., 2020; Kungl, 2015). Other authors, especially in the innovation and strategic management literature, take 
a Schumpeterian perspective and define incumbents more generally as the established firms in a particular industry (cf. Buenstorf, 
2016). With reference to the triple embeddedness framework by Geels (2014a), the first perspective equals incumbents with “core 
firms”, while the latter also includes “firms in the middle” of an industry. In this paper, we adopt the latter perspective as it corresponds 
better with our management oriented analytical framework and also mirrors the diversity of actors on the Swedish market. 
Several types of electricity companies have a long tradition of building and operating power plants and selling electricity in 
Sweden: the state-owned utility Vattenfall and, foreign-based utilities such as E.ON and Fortum (core firms) as well as privately owned 
energy companies and municipal energy companies (firms in the middle) (Bergek et al., 2013). Before the liberalization of the Swedish 
electricity market in 1996, these were integrated electric utilities that owned the electricity transmission and distribution grids, the 
local district heating systems, and most of the electricity generation capacity. As a result of the liberalization and the resulting 
‘un-bundling’ of production and grid operation, there are now two main types of incumbent actors in this industry: grid operators and 
electricity retailers. Since electricity market regulations imply that it is infeasible for grid operators to adopt the solar business models 
discussed in section 2, we delimit our study to electricity retailers. Most electricity retailers belong to a company group that also 
includes production and/or grid operations (in a separate subsidiary) while some are pure trading companies. Independent electricity 
producers without any electricity retail business were not included in the study since they are new entrants rather than incumbents in 
the electricity industry. 
The analysis is delimited to the 30 largest electricity retailers in terms of number of end-customers (see Table 1), since these can be 
seen as the most established ones. Two thirds of the selected retailers have inhouse electricity production assets, and the majority of 
them (14 out of 20) operate a small share of solar production in Sweden or abroad. It should be noted that selecting companies based on 
market share implies that the studied retailers might not be the most active ones in terms of solar. Moreover, the study is a snapshot 
taken within a limited time frame which aims at capturing the current experimentation and adoption of solar models by electricity 
retailers. However, since the technology is still developing and diffusing at a rapid pace, this adoption pattern will most likely not 
remain stable. 
3.3. Data collection and analysis 
To map the adoption pattern, secondary data was collected to gain an overview of the solar PV market in Sweden. These data were 
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found in market reports from public energy agencies and similar organizations. Data on the companies’ solar offers and projects were 
collected from annual reports, project reports and company websites (May—September 2019). These secondary data were com-
plemented by a pre-study consisting of short phone interviews and e-mail contacts with retailers, which served to identify cases for 
further interviews. 
Conclusions about strategic fit were achieved in an iterative process. Existing literature and results from the pre-study generated 
ideas for an interview study, which in turn generated clues to be verified by secondary data. The findings presented in Section 4 stem 
from this iterative process. The interview study was carried out from November 2019 to June 2020. It consisted of nine semi-structured 
interviews, mainly with (solar) business developers, compiled in order to represent the diversity of retailers and therefore including 
different firm sizes and ownership types (see Table 2). These in-depth interviews were complemented by e-mail and phone conver-
sations with in total 28 out of the 30 electricity retailers.1 
As described by Kathuria et al. (2007), the literature on strategic fit does not define or operationalize ‘alignment’ very explicitly but 
rather uses various more tentative words such as ‘coherence’, ‘consistency’, ‘coordination’, ‘agreement’, and ‘match’ to describe a high 
degree of alignment. We therefore had to develop our own conceptual basis for assessment. 
The assessment of horizontal alignment of the different solar business models was done in two steps. The first step was to specify the 
incumbent electricity retailer business model, as a baseline for the comparison from secondary sources and our own previous un-
derstanding of the specificities of the Swedish electricity market. The second step was to understand each solar model in detail and 
compare it with the established retailer model. 
Table 1 
Retailers included in the empirical study.  
Electricity retail company name No. of 
customers 
Ownership structure Majority owner(s) Electricity production (TWh) 
(whereof solar)a 
Affärsverken Karlskrona 28 000 Municipal Karlskrona municipality (n.a.) 
Bixia 210 000 Municipal Linköping and six other Swedish 
municipalities 
– 
Borås Elhandel 63 000 State-owned Vattenfall AB – 
E.ON Sverige 675 000 Private/ International E.ON Nordic AB 1.1 (<1%) 
Energi Försäljning Sverige 60 000 Municipal/ 
International 
Multiple municipalities in Denmark – 
Eskilstuna Strängnäs Energi och 
Miljö 
46 000 Municipal Eskilstuna and Strängnäs 
municipalities 
(n.a.) 
Fortum 935 000 State-owned The State of Finland 74.6 (<1%) 
Fyrfasen Energi 40 000 Municipal/ 
International 
Multiple municipalities in Finland – 
God El 90 000 Private Non-profit foundation – 
Gotlands Energi 33 000 Municipal/ 
State-owned 
Vattenfall AB and Gotland region 
(25%) 
– 
Gävle Energi 37 000 Municipal Gävle municipality 0.1 (n.a.) 
Göteborg Energi 275 000 Municipal Göteborg municipality 4.2 (<1%) 
Halmstad Energi och Miljö 30 000 Municipal Halmstad municipality (n.a.) 
Jämtkraft 261 000 Municipal Östersund, Åre and Krokom 
municipalities 
1.1 (<1%) 
Jönköping Energi 42 000 Municipal Jönköping municipality 0.3 (n.a.) 
Kalmar Energi 27 000 Private/ Municipal Kalmar municipality and E.ON Sverige 
(50%) 
0.1 (2%) 
Karlstads Energi 41 000 Municipal Karlstad municipality 0.1 (n.a.) 
Kraftringen 129 000 Municipal Lund and three other municipalities 0.2 (n.a.) 
Luleå Energi 41 000 Municipal Luleå municipality (n.a.) 
Mälarenergi 133 000 Municipal Västerås municipality 0.5 (n.a.) 
Mölndal Energi 101 000 Municipal Mölndal municipality 0.1 (n.a.) 
Nordic Green Energy 80 000 Municipal/ 
International 
Troms region in Norway – 
Skellefteå Kraft 170 000 Municipal Skellefteå municipality 4.9 (n.a.) 
Stockholms Elbolag 28 000 Private Swedish construction- and housing 
company 
– 
Storuman Energi 58 000 Municipal/ 
International 
Multiple municipalities in Norway – 
Telge Energi 180 000 Municipal Södertälje municipality – 
Umeå Energi 51 000 Municipal Umeå municipality <0.1 (<1%) 
Varberg Energi/Viva 46 000 Municipal Varberg municipality 0.1 (3%) 
Vattenfall AB 927 000 State-owned The State of Sweden 130.3 (<1%) 
Öresundskraft 100 000 Municipal Helsingborg municipality 0.2 (n.a.)  
a The most recent available numbers 2018—2020. Explanations: (n.a.) = not available; – = no production). 
1 Nordic Green Energy and Stockholms Elbolag have not responded to our communication attempts. These firms are blacklisted by Konsu-
mentverket (the Swedish consumer protection agency). 
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To operationalize the business model concept, we used the “Business Model Canvas” (Osterwalder et al., 2005; Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010) as it has established itself as one of the most commonly used frameworks, especially in the solar PV literature. It consists 
of four main dimensions, which can be divided into nine components: value proposition, customer interface (customer segments, 
channels, and customer relationships), infrastructure management (key resources, key activities, and key partnerships), and financial 
aspects (cost structure and revenue streams) (see Table 3 for a detailed explanation). 
The degree of horizontal alignment was operationalized taking theories about incumbents’ responses to technological disconti-
nuities as a starting point. From this point of view, a case with no alignment would be one in which a new business model is disruptive 
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995) and competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), i.e. reduces the value of the current 
value network, resources, partnerships etc. of established companies or even makes them entirely obsolete. A case with clear horizontal 
alignment would be one in which the new business model is sustaining (cf. Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995), 
competence-enhancing (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) or symbiotic (Geels and Schot, 2007), i.e. reinforces the value of existing value 
networks and resources. In reality, we do not expect to see these two extremes but rather a combination of different degrees of 
alignment in different business model dimensions and components. We therefore developed our own operationalization of horizontal 
alignment that describes what a high degree could look like for each business model component (see Table 3). 
Based on this operationalization, a detailed, component-by-component comparison was made for each solar model based on a 
deductive analysis of a combination of secondary and primary data (as described above). Missing or conflicting information was 
handled using interview data. The authors discussed the horizontal alignment of each business model component and dimension and 
made a qualitative assessment of the degree of alignment. Whenever the authors could not reach consensus, more data were collected 
in interviews or through email communications with selected retailers until the conflict was resolved. To simplify the presentation of 
the findings, the component-level results were synthesized into an assessment of the degree of horizontal alignment for each of the four 
overarching business model dimensions. 
In a final step of the analysis, vertical and environmental alignment were assessed through an inductive approach. The interview 
data were scrutinized from the bottom up to identify factors described by the retailers as important for their choices of which business 
models to adopt. These factors were then categorized as corresponding to either vertical or environmental alignment, based on the 
theoretical descriptions of these concepts (as described in section 2). Within each of these two categories, we gathered similar types of 
influences into more general categories in a bottom-up, interpretative process. For example, we saw that several interviewees talked 
about how certain models enabled them to achieve some of their organizational goals, whereas other models created goal conflicts. We 
gathered these kinds of influences under the common label of ‘organizational goals’. In Section 4, we summarize the strategic con-
siderations we gathered under each label, with examples and illustrative quotes from different companies. When assessing the degree 
of alignment, we followed Henderson and Venkatraman (1999), Yamakawa et al. (2011), and Cornelius du Preez and Folinas (2019), 
among others. We focused our analysis on whether a specific solar business model was compatible with, or could even enable or 
contribute to, corporate level goals and strategies (vertical alignment) and whether it was compatible with, or could even help the 
company respond to, incentives and pressures in the company’s task and institutional environment (environmental alignment)(see 
Table 4 for examples). This qualitative assessment was based in large parts on the interviewees’ descriptions of potential synergies and 
conflicts between the solar business models and the other strategic dimensions. 
4. Solar model adoption and strategic fit analysis 
In this section, we present the specific characteristics of the five dominant solar models in the Swedish context and map the re-
tailers’ adoption of each model, which is summarized in Table 5.2 The solar models are labelled corresponding to the value proposition 
they represent and introduced in the order of most to least adopted. We compare each solar model with the generic electricity retailer 
business model (see Table 6) as well as its vertical and environmental alignment. Based on this comparison, we then discuss to what 
extent the degree of strategic fit explains the overall adoption pattern of each solar model. 
Table 2 
Interview sample.  
Case title No. of customers (thousands) Ownership6 Position of interviewee Duration (h:m) 
Retailer A 100—500 Public Business Unit Manager Products and Services 1:08 
Retailer B 100—500 Public Product specialist solar 1:11 
Retailer C 100—500 Public Business Development Solar 2:15 
Retailer D <100 Private Business Development 0:50 
Retailer E <100 Public Business Development Solar 1:13 
Retailer F 100—500 Public CEO 0:39 
Retailer G < 100 Public Business Development 1:26 
Retailer H >500 Public Product specialist solar 1:43 
Retailer I >500 Public Vice President Business Development 1:10  
6 ‘Public’ summarizes municipal or state ownership, in order not to reveal the company identities. 
2 Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) are not included in this overview and the following analysis due to the lack of secondary data for the 
Swedish market during the main data collection period. 
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4.1. PV turnkey sales 
PV turnkey sales is the most widely adopted solar model among the studied retailers. Indeed, a majority of the retailers (21 of 30) 
sell PV turnkey systems to household customers and some of them have engaged with this model for almost a decade (Palm, 2016). 
In principle, this model corresponds to the ‘host-ownership’ archetype described in previous literature. The value proposition 
offered by the retailers is a hassle-free investment which allows customers to own a PV system and produce their own electricity 
without much involvement. The ‘turnkey’ aspect includes key activities such as system configuration and installation, administrative, 
legal and investment support, and customer management (Aspeteg and Bergek, 2020; Aspeteg and Mignon, 2019). However, retailers 
partly avoid the complexity of this model by focusing on sales, while outsourcing many other activities to solar PV installation firms. In 
Table 3 
Business model component descriptions and operationalization of horizontal alignment.  
Main dimensions Components Description Characteristics of a high degree of horizontal alignment 
Value proposition  The company’s bundle of goods and services, and this 
bundle’s benefits for customers (e.g. newness, 
performance, customization, price, accessibility or 
convenience). 
The new value proposition is compatible with or 
complements the existing value proposition, e.g. by 
providing a broader product portfolio or a means for 






The different groups of people or organizations a company 
wants to serve (e.g. specific niches, closely related 
segments, or mass market). 
The new business model either targets (sub-sets of) 
existing customer segments and utilizes existing channels 
and customer relationships or only implies customer 
interface additions that have little consequence for the 
established model.  
Channels The means through which the company communicates 
with its customers to deliver a value proposition, including 
awareness, evaluation, purchase, delivery and post- 
purchase support.  
Customer 
relationships 
The kind of links a company wants to have to its different 
customer segments, including customer acquisition, 
exploitation and retainment. 
Infrastructure 
management 
Key activities The most important activities (e.g. production or problem- 
solving) required to create and deliver the value 
proposition, including selection of which to perform in- 
house. 
The new model either builds on the same (type of) 
activities and utilizes existing resources and partnerships 
or only implies infrastructure management changes that 
have little consequence for the established model.  
Key resources The most important physical, financial, intellectual and 




The network of suppliers and partners required to create 
and deliver the value proposition. 
Financial aspects Cost structure The fixed and variable costs that result from operating the 
business model, accounting for economies of scale, scope 
and experience. 
The new model either results in a similar cost structure and 
generates revenues in the same way as before or implies 
financial aspect changes that have little consequence for 
the established model.  Revenue 
streams 
The way a company generates income from each customer 
segment, including pricing mechanisms. 
Sources: Descriptions of business model dimensions and components are based on (Dubosson-Torbay et al., 2002; Osterwalder et al., 2005; Oster-
walder and Pigneur, 2010). The conceptualization of ‘fit’ for each dimension was developed by the authors specifically for this paper. 
Table 4 
Conceptualization of vertical and environmental alignment.  
Strategic fit 
dimension 
Characteristics of a high degree of 
alignment 
Types of issues considered Examples of high versus low alignment 
Vertical 
alignment 
The solar model is compatible with – or 
even enables – the company’s corporate- 
level strategies. 
Corporate goals and objectives; Strategic 
orientation (e.g. dominant business logic or 
competitive strategy);Business scope (e.g. 
product-market strategy). 
A solar model that creates societal value (e.g. 
through more dispersed ownership) has a high 
degree of vertical alignment for a firm that 
pursues social goals but a low degree of 




The solar model is compatible with – or 
even helps the company respond to 
–incentives and pressures in its task and 
institutional environment. 
Task environment: market-related factors 
connected to suppliers/partners, 
competitors, or customers; Institutional 
environment: norms, regulations, and 
cognitive rules. 
A solar model that helps a firm meet a specific 
(emerging) customer demand or is compatible 
with a particular regulation has a high degree 
of environmental alignment, whereas a model 
that creates a competitive disadvantage or 
challenges existing societal norms has a low 
degree of alignment. 
Sources: Own conceptualization developed specifically for this paper. 
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the customer interface dimension, retailers’ sales representatives acquire and consult customers, configure plants, and manage con-
tracts and invoices. In the infrastructure management dimension, they leave the installation of the plant to their new partners: the 
installation firms. With regard to financial aspects, a one-off project margin replaces monthly recurring revenues from electricity bills. 
Retailers differ in how they design the specifics of this business model, for instance which customer segments they offer turnkey 
systems to, whether the installation firm operates under the same brand as the retailer, and the exact division of labour between the 
collaborating firms. 
The overall horizontal alignment of PV turnkey sales is poor. Its value proposition threatens retailers’ established business model by 
increasing competition in electricity production and reducing customers’ need to buy electricity. It, therefore, has a long-term 
disruptive potential. Moreover, the customer interface requires face-to-face interaction and the revenue stream is a one-off trans-
action. In the infrastructure dimension, retailers try to manage misalignment through outsourcing to solar installation firms (as 
mentioned above). While this reduces the need to acquire new resources (e.g. technical installation knowledge and personnel) and 
engage in new key activities (e.g. purchasing and warehousing), it requires them to develop new key partnerships and workflows. 
In contrast, the PV turnkey sales model shows a high degree of vertical alignment for retailers who pursue an overall sustainability 
strategy focusing on renewable energies (Retailers A, B, G, F, H). In addition, this model allows municipally owned retailers to meet 
their owners’ social goals (Retailers A, G, E): 
“I think the solar business in itself it is in all our three goals. If we help people to make their own electricity, there is more place on the grid 
for heavy industrial locations … And it’s very sustainable. And we are making profit of it. So it doesn’t [have to] be any crash between 
them.” (Retailer A) 
“[O]ur main mission is to help our fellow people in the municipal area.” (Retailer E) 
At the same time, several retailers mention the misalignment between the turnkey model and the business logics of electricity retail 
and construction of large power plants (Retailers A, B, C, E, H and I), as PV turnkey sales requires much more intense customer 
interaction. 
“Companies have found is that you can’t just take the engineering approach in selling solar systems. The customers are interested in so 
much other things than just the hardware. And I think that was perhaps a little hurdle for us as well. Used to delivering things, installing 
things and then leave. And here we have other soft issues that was as... As important for the customer as the hardware itself. (Retailer E) 
"We are the same electricity company that we always have been, so... […] we want to sell solar PV in the old way of working, but we 
can’t. We need to find a new way of working.” (Retailer H) 
Table 5 
Solar models adopted by the retailers.  










Affärsverken Karlskrona X - - X - 
Bixia - X - - - 
Borås Elhandel X X - - - 
E.ON Sverige X X - - - 
Energi Försäljning Sverige - - - - - 
Eskilstuna Strängnäs Energi och 
Miljö 
X - X - - 
Fortum X - - - - 
Fyrfasen Energi X X - - - 
God El - - - - - 
Gotlands Energi X - - - - 
Gävle Energi X X - - - 
Göteborg Energi - X X X - 
Halmstad Energi och Miljö - X - - - 
Jämtkraft X - - X - 
Jönköping Energi X X - - - 
Kalmar Energi X - X X - 
Karlstads Energi - X - - - 
Kraftringen X X X - - 
Luleå Energi X X - - - 
Mälarenergi - X X X - 
Mölndal Energi X - X - - 
Nordic Green Energy X - X - - 
Skellefteå Kraft X X - - - 
Stockholms Elbolag - - - - - 
Storuman Energi - X - - - 
Telge Energi X X X - - 
Umeå Energi X - - - X 
Varberg Energi/Viva X X X - - 
Vattenfall X X X - - 
Öresundskraft X - - X - 
Adoption rate 21 17 10 6 1  




Detailed solar business model description and horizontal alignment analysis.  
Business model components Established electricity retail 
business model 
Solar model   
PV turnkey sales Premium reimbursement Solar electricity sales Community solar 
intermediation 
PV plant leasing 
Value proposition Carefree and reliable (fossil 
free/renewable) electricity at 
reasonably low cost 
Hassle-free ownership of solar PV 
system = disruptive potential to 
reduce electricity sales 
Reimbursement for 
excess electricity at a 
premium price =
counterintuitive but not 
complex or difficult 
‘Green’ sub-set of value 
proposition = minor 
differentiation (and 
similar to existing sales of 
wind & hydro power) 
Facilitating share-ownership 
= disruptive potential to 
reduce electricity sales, but 
retailer remains involved 
Low up-front cost solar adoption 
with low hassle = disruptive 
potential to reduce electricity 
sales, but retailer remains 
involved 
Customer segments Retailers target all consumers 
connected to the grid. 
Sub-segment (potential 
prosumers, i.e. customers who 
want to become electricity 
producers; access to capital) 
Sub-segment (prosumers) Sub-segment (customers 
with preference for solar 
electricity) 
Sub-segment (potential 
prosumers who cannot (or do 
not want to) install solar on 
their own premises, or has 
limited access to capital) 
Sub-segment (potential prosumers 
with lower risk propensity and/or 
limited access to capital) 
Channels Least direct contact possible 
(e.g. online electricity 
contracts); customer 
acquisition partly as default 
regional electricity suppliers. 
Standard forms and phone calls +
potential site visits later project 
phases: outsourcing of face-to-face 
customer contacts 
Utilizes existing channels Utilizes existing channels Requires new, more local 
channels (e.g. walks through 
the solar park) = poor 
alignment for pure trading 
firms without regional 
anchoring 
Standard forms and phone calls; 
later project phases: outsourcing 
of face-to-face customer contacts 
Customer relationship ‘Arm’s-length’ relationship 
with rather anonymous 
(mass) market 
Retailer outsources large share of 
the customized aspects of each 
project 
Prosumers need more 
support than average 
B2C-customers (e.g. 
administration of 
guarantees of origin) 
Utilizes existing customer 
relationships and follows 
the same logic 
The members of the 
cooperative (shareholders) 
become temporarily locked in 
to retailer as electricity 
consumers 
Partial customization but 
standardized procedures (cf. 
channels) 
Key activities Trading, metering, and billing Customer acquisition, sales, 
project management 
(+occasionally customer service). 
Other key activities (e.g. PV 
system procurement and 
installation) are outsourced 
Payments to prosumers 
need to be deducted from 
electricity bills, which 
requires new, but simple 
routines. 
Similar key activities Project management and 
handling of the cooperative 
are not competence- 
destroying but more time- 
intensive; (smaller-scale) 
plant operation required 
Project-based business (contracts 
+ financing + insurance + taking- 
back plants after leasing period) 
= requires service-oriented 
mindset; (smaller-scale) plant 
operation required 
Key resources Expertise in engineering, 
system operation, and 
managing and collaborating 
in large projects 
Project- and partnership- 
management skills applicable; 
more time-intensive because of 
new sales process 
Prosumers need a more 
advanced electricity 
meter (which is provided 
by the grid operator in a 
standard procedure) 
Guarantees of origin need 
to be handled on a 
smaller scale compared 
with other renewables 
Existing project- and 
partnership-management 
knowledge applicable; new 
PV-specific knowledge is 
required; more time-intensive 
Existing knowledge is not 
applicable; new intermediary, 
legal and PV-specific knowledge 
needed 
Key partnerships  New partners: contracted PV 
installation firms 
No additional partners 
required 
No additional partners 
required 
New partners: cooperative; 
engineering firms specialized 
on solar construction 
Contracted PV installation firm 
(same as partner for PV turnkey 
sales) 
Cost structure Capital-intensive production 
determines the cost structure, 
directly (through own 
production) or indirectly (via 
the electricity spot market or 
PPAs). 
Higher personnel cost, but no 
impact on traditional model 
Higher cost per unit than 
for electricity from the 
spot market 
Less capital-intensive Smaller initial investment +
the investment is later 
outsourced to the cooperative 
Smaller-scale capital investments 
and higher personnel costs 
Revenue streams Monthly revenues from 
electricity sales supplemented 
by the sale of tradable 
guarantees of origin and 
green certificates. 
One-off transaction (project 
margin / commission fee) instead 
of monthly revenues 
No revenue stream for 
retailer 
No difference in revenue 
streams 
No difference in revenue 
streams 
Monthly leasing fees for 
equipment (+ electricity sales) 
Sources: Own analysis based in part on Hannon et al. (2013), Helms (2016), and Small and Frantzis (2010). 
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Despite this misalignment, all the beforementioned firms sell PV turnkey systems. One exception is a privately owned retailer for 
whom solar models do not fit into their lean portfolio. 
Concerning the environmental alignment, several retailers see a growing demand for turnkey systems from their existing customers 
(A, E, F) and perceive that customers in general have developed from ‘early adopters to ‘early majority’ (Retailer A, H) who expect PV 
turnkey sales as a hygiene factor (Retailer B). An exception is a privately owned retailer: 
“It’s about knowing your customer. In our case, almost all the customers live in apartments. So they can’t buy their own PV system.” 
(Retailer D) 
Moreover, as mentioned above (and confirmed by all the interviews), the crux of successful PV turnkey sales lies in finding suitable 
partners to outsource parts of the key activities to: 
“If I compare with starting a district heating system or building a hydro power plant, that’s much more difficult. Here it’s more about 
finding a partner, discussing how should we do this together.” (Retailer A) 
In Sweden, this is enabled by an already existing ecosystem of solar PV installers, which the retailers can exploit. However, the 
interviewees also mention sources of misalignment. Most notably, several of them argue that PV turnkey sales is largely unprofitable 
(Retailers B, C, E).3 
“It’s too little money in it. There hasn’t been any incentive, economically speaking, earlier.” (Retailer B) 
In addition, the turnkey market is subjected to complex building regulations (G, H) as well as uncertain economic policies (Retailers 
A, B, C, H): 
“The only thing that is hard in this market is the ... changes in governmental economical support. […] Yesterday, for example, they closed 
down the support for farmers …. Bang, gone overnight, nobody heard about it. […] The biggest problem for us. The government gives 
support ... [but there is] not money enough. So when the money ... is gone, [it] makes a big mess of the market.” (Retailer A) 
To sum up, the strategic fit analysis shows that the PV turnkey sales model on the one hand shows signs of misalignment in all three 
dimensions as it is characterized by a disruptive value proposition, complex customer interface, and nonrecurring payments (hori-
zontal dimension), has an incompatible business logic (vertical dimension), and is perceived as unprofitable and restricted by complex 
and uncertain regulations (environmental dimension). On the other hand, PV turnkey sales can be made easier to adopt through 
outsourcing (horizontal dimension) in collaboration with existing installation firms (environmental dimension), is well aligned with 
general sustainability strategies and municipal owners’ social and environmental goals (vertical dimension), and meets a (perceived) 
customer demand (environmental dimension). Considering the degree of adoption, the latter alignment characteristics clearly 
compensate for the negative ones. 
4.2. Premium reimbursement 
Premium reimbursement has not been identified as a solar model in previous literature but is rather common in the Swedish 
context. Reimbursement is a monetary compensation to prosumers for the excess solar electricity that they feed into the grid. Elec-
tricity retailers are mandated by law to receive electricity fed into the grid from micro-production units, such as solar PV plants. 
However, they are not required to offer any financial compensation for this electricity. Nevertheless, almost all of the studied retailers 
(29 of 30) offer reimbursement at spot market prices, and more than half of them (17 out of 30) offer a (time-limited) price premium. 
It might seem counterintuitive to purchase electricity from micro-producers at a premium price unless this cost can be compensated 
for elsewhere. Roughly half of the retailers that have adopted this model (9 out of 17) consequently integrate premium reimbursement 
with other solar models. For example, some retailers sell the solar electricity at an even higher price to other customers through solar 
electricity sales, whereas others only offer premium reimbursement to customers who buy their turnkey systems through them. 
However, just as many retailers (8 out of 17) offer a stand-alone version of the premium reimbursement model, i.e. they do not link it to 
any other PV business model in their portfolio, which implies that it could be considered a unique value proposition directed at micro- 
producers. 
Premium reimbursement aligns well with the established electricity retailer model in the horizontal dimension. The value prop-
osition of this model is extra compensation for excess electricity, which complements the retailers’ existing offers to micro-producers. 
It has no distinguishing characteristics in the customer interface or financial aspects, and blends smoothly with existing business 
operations since it can be implemented without additional key partners, activities, or resources. 
However, the interviews reveal that horizontal alignment is not necessarily the most determining factor in this case. Instead, 
premium reimbursement is mainly a way to gain and retain customers in the longer term (mentioned in nearly all interviews), 
indicating a high degree of vertical alignment: 
“It’s mostly to get the electricity contract with the customer. If we should find the customers on ‘Pricerunner’ or ‘Elskling’ [i.e. online 
platforms for comparing prices] … we have to pay for that too. … So that’s a good investment to get electricity contract customers. 
[Interviewer: Do you lose money with that?] Yes, of course.” (Retailer A) 
Moreover, it aligns with the organizational goal of municipally owned electricity retailers to contribute to the diffusion of solar 
3 In contrast, Retailer F argues that selling PV turnkey systems can be a profitable business since prosumers are usually not too price-sensitive and 
also buy additional electricity. 
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energy in the society (Retailer C) and to create an environmental company image (Retailers C and F). 
“[Interviewer:] But it’s still a minus business as a whole? [Retailer C:] Yes, slightly. .... And then comes the next question: Why are we 
doing this? And one thing is that we like solar. So we want to stimulate more people [to] want to start with solar.” 
In this regard, Retailer B is an exceptional case, since it has been working with micro-producers for wind and solar for many years, 
before other retailers were interested in this business, and see premium reimbursement as part of their overall corporate strategy: 
“We have a background in locally produced energy. And we have built up a network of many small producers … and in that way we can 
package locally produced electricity by buying guarantees of origin. And that, I guess, is our USP, that is what distinguishes us from the 
others.” (Retailer B) 
The environmental alignment of premium reimbursement has two facets: On the one hand, the model is a poor deal for all retailers 
(except Retailer F that has signed the most micro-producers of all retailers and couples this with solar electricity contracts and PV 
turnkey sales). On the other hand, nearly all interviewees expressed the need to catch up with their competitors in order to satisfy 
customer expectations: 
“We’ve noticed pretty clearly that what other companies do in other businesses affects the expectations from the customers when they 
become our customer.” (Retailer D) 
To sum up, the wide adoption of premium reimbursement might seem counterintuitive at a first glance, considering that it is largely 
perceived as unprofitable (misalignment in environmental dimension). However, it is almost identical with the electricity retail 
business model in the horizontal dimension (and therefore simple to adopt), and is also aligned with the goal to retain customers 
(vertical dimension) and the need to match the competitors’ offers in order to meet customer expectations (environmental dimension). 
4.3. Solar electricity sales 
One third of the retailers (10 out of 30) sell solar electricity contracts, which combines several archetypical solar models. The 
retailers source the electricity from utility-side and customer-side solar plants: four use solar electricity from their own solar parks, 
while others buy it from community solar parks, micro-producers, or the spot market. 
The horizontal alignment is high for all business model dimensions except infrastructure management. Solar electricity sales pro-
vides a slightly differentiated value proposition and targets a narrower customer segment than the established retailer business model, 
i.e. those interested specifically in solar electricity for technical, environmental or economic reasons (cf. Palm, 2018). This resembles 
the dedicated wind and hydropower contracts that already exist in the Swedish market. In contrast, the infrastructure dimension 
differs substantially from the established model in that retailers must have dedicated processes to handle guarantees of origin in order 
to sell solar electricity bought directly from (micro-)producers rather than from the spot market. What distinguishes solar from other 
renewables in this respect is the larger number of micro-producers, which creates time-consuming paperwork. Combined with the lack 
of sophisticated software, which means that the matching of production and consumptionhas to be done manually, this is a surprisingly 
large hurdle: it was repeatedly mentioned in the interviews as a reason for not engaging with solar electricity sales and instead 
integrating the solar electricity from micro-producers into a general ‘renewables mix’:4 
“The system that Energimyndigheten [i.e. The Swedish Energy Agency] has for GoOs and electricity certificates is not very compatible with 
other systems. So it’s a lots of manual work ... It’s very hard to keep track of it. They work quite a lot manually with Excel to … keep record of 
everything. But if we do a few agreements with larger [producers], it’s easier …” 
In terms of vertical alignment, most retailers did not have much to say, presumably because selling solar electricity contracts is 
similar to their existing business and market logics. However, Retailer D highlighted that it is not well aligned with its market strategy 
since they only sell renewable electricity that is certified with the Swedish environmental label ‘Bra Miljöval’ (‘Good Environmental 
Choice’) (which is not applied to most available solar electricity), while retailer F argued that the model suits its overall solar portfolio 
and is in line with its organizational goal to enable adoption for different customer groups. 
The interviewees opinions were stronger in regard to environmental alignment, where there was an agreement that the solar elec-
tricity sales model is misaligned in several ways, especially with the task environment. Most notably, the model is not considered 
profitable (B, C) and there is a shortage of supply of certified Swedish solar electricity (C, D, H). 
“But yeah, so you can understand the Math.… So they [i.e. the micro-producers] get 25 öre extra and we sell it for 2.50. So it’s not a 
good business right now.” (Retailer C). 
“Even though our customers want to buy solar electricity, we can’t offer it today, there’s not enough volume. … It would probably only 
last for like 100 customers in a year or something. So, it’s not worth it.” (Retailer D) 
“It’s a fight about the guarantees of origin for the solar power. […] it’s not much solar power out there in the market.” (Retailer H) 
Solar electricity is also still a niche market, which most customers are not interested in, as explained by Retailer E: 
“No, we don’t have that. I know it’s sort of a small market by itself and some actors are niching into this … [but] we haven’t seen that it’s 
a big driver for the customers yet.” (Retailer E) 
4 Retailer F stands out in this regard as it has developed a software for handling micro-producers and has even received acquisition offers because 
of this advanced system. 
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Nevertheless, several retailers see an emerging customer demand for buying solar electricity contracts (C, D, F, H), and this led C 
and H to adopt this solar model with guarantees of origin from other European markets. 
To sum up, solar electricity sales is only adopted moderately although it has the strongest horizontal alignment of all solar models. 
However, the infrastructure dimension is a challenge because of complicated handling of guarantees of origin. Moreover, in the 
environmental dimension the model is perceived unprofitable and there is a shortage of supply. It should also be noted that all retailers 
already have other renewable energy contracts, which results in a lack of strategic differentiation on a vertical level. Retailers who do 
adopt solar electricity sales are mainly driven by a perceived customer demand (environmental dimension). 
4.4. Community solar intermediation 
Six out of 30 retailers engage with community solar parks. Only one retailer, Göteborg Energi, operates it as a traditional utility-led 
community solar park (cf. Funkhouser et al., 2015). The other five retailers have chosen to intermediate rather than own the plants: 
they develop the project and enrol citizens, local businesses and the municipality at an early stage but later detach the ownership into a 
cooperative, which owns the land and the production plant, sells shares, and pays dividends to its members (Magnusson and Palm, 
2019).5 The retailer continues to handle plant maintenance and solar electricity sales to the shareowners and also sell additional 
electricity to them when needed. Notably, this setup combines utility-side and customer-side logics as introduced in section 2.1. 
Overall, the horizontal alignment of this model is moderate. The value proposition of community solar intermediation allows 
consumers to own a share of a plant to cover part of their electricity consumption. This competes with retailers’ electricity sales. 
However, even though the cooperative owns the plant, the dependency on the retailer’s technical expertise remains high. As the 
retailer stays involved – albeit in a different capacity – the long-term disruptive potential is smaller than for turnkey systems. In terms 
of customer interface, the model mainly requires additional human resources. During the initiation phase of a project, the retailer 
engages face-to-face with diverse potential customers, for which it requires access through local channels. In this phase, the key ac-
tivities therefore consist mainly of customer management and project development, which are complementary to the retailers’ 
established business (with small adaptations). However, pure retailing firms do not have experience in these areas and lack the 
manpower and corporate culture to make large capital investments. Most manual and time-consuming activities, such as shareholder 
coordination, are outsourced to the cooperative. This division of labour comes with another advantage from the retailers’ perspective: 
low risk in terms of financial aspects, as the cooperative manages the investment through selling shares. 
Regarding vertical alignment, the interviewees were of slightly diverging opinions. The publicly owned retailers for the most part 
describe it as very well aligned with their organizational goals (A, C, H, F). One of them even described how its owner, the munici-
pality, lowered its profit requirements in order for the retailer to be able to realize a community solar park for its citizens (Retailer C). 
However, other retailers consider community solar to be misaligned with their overall corporate visions (Retailer B), investment 
strategies (Retailer I) and general ways of running business (Retailer E, which does not operate any other large-scale electricity 
production plants). 
In terms of environmental alignment, Retailers A, C and G recognize a market demand from customers who have less purchasing 
power or do not own houses: 
“We wanted to attract customers who weren’t that wealthy … customers [who] are afraid for climate or are climate friendly but not all 
have a lot of money …” (Retailer C) 
“We have a lot of apartments here … and they are also very interested in solar cells. But they can’t buy them. Or, they can buy them, but 
they can’t put them anywhere. So we’re thinking that they could like rent or buy, or whatever, some share of it.” (Retailer G) 
However, other retailers identify several types of environmental misalignment as obstacles for adopting the community solar 
model: unavailability of land (A, F, H), poor profitability (A, I), and complicated, unfavourable and unstable regulations (B, C, E, F). 
Retailer H also mentions the lack of a suitable business models as a barrier, as the existing business model for wind community parks 
cannot be copy-pasted to solar. 
“We have looked into that. It’s legally a bit tricky from a tax perspective …. And then it [the park] becomes an economic association with 
all that this implies.” (Retailer B) 
To sum up, community solar intermediation is horizontally misaligned in some dimensions (value proposition, customer interface, 
and some key activities), whereas other aspects align well with the established business model – at least for “integrated” retailers. It 
should here be noted that all retailers that have adopted this model are part of integrated, municipally owned energy companies that 
combine electricity production, grid operations, and retailing, and that have strong ties to their local communities. In these cases, 
strong vertical alignment with social and environmental sustainability goals seem to be able to compensate for horizontal misalign-
ment as well as for poor environmental alignment in the form of complex, unfavourable, and unstable regulations, scarcity of land, and 
lack of profitability. In contrast, the community solar intermediation model is generally less appealing to ‘pure’ retailers. 
5 This cooperative model was in place before retailers started to be involved in the development of community solar parks and has also been used 
for wind power projects (cf. Mignon and Rüdinger, 2016). 
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4.5. PV plant leasing 
Only one Swedish retailer, Umeå Energi, offers PV plant leasing. Leasing enables consumers to use solar panels with low up-front 
cost and low risk. In contrast to PV turnkey sales, leasing allows the retailer to retain ownership of the plant and remain in control over 
electricity production and sales. 
The horizontal alignment of leasing is moderate. Its value proposition (as described above) complements existing business offers. 
Moreover, the financial aspects are characterized by monthly payments, which is in line with incumbent electricity sales. However, the 
complexity of the leasing model lies within the infrastructure dimension. As for PV turnkey sales, leasing requires complex inter-
mediary activities and knowledge and the respective personnel, purchasing and warehousing, although this can be reduced sub-
stantially through outsourcing. Here, there are potential synergies between the two models in that existing partnerships from PV 
turnkey sales can be used for leasing. Compared with PV turnkey sales, however, key resources such as drawing up leasing contracts 
and arranging to take back PV equipment after the leasing period require novel partners and complex legal knowledge. 
With regard to vertical alignment, leasing should be in line with the societal goals of some (municipally owned) retailers: 
“Since we’re owned by the municipality, we could think that we’re going to do something [of] more benefit for the little person. … So it 
should be easier for ordinary customers. /…/ It will be quite hard to make a profit off of it. And it’s a lot of work … But still, it could be a 
possibility if we really, really want it …” (Retailer C) 
However, several interviewees emphasize how difficult it is to implement leasing as it requires them to offer long-term financing 
solutions, which differs from the logic and mindset of selling electricity or even PV turnkey systems: 
“For us, the question about if we should be a bank or not is the most important. And then, there we have decided to not offer this part.” 
(Retailer A) 
“Well, it’s more of a mindset than something practical. […] It’s a different business model which hasn’t been tested. Which we hadn’t 
tested at least. And we used to install and leave and now we should live with subscribing customers. It’s different... A totally different 
issue.” (Retailer E) 
The overall environmental alignment is weak as it is difficult to find the right financing partners and define the legal terms: “We’re 
also looking into this leasing, or rental. I think we will start with it during the spring, hopefully, but … there’s a lot of legal issues with these leasing 
… things.” (Retailer G) 
In terms of customer demand, the interviewees are of different opinions; while some have identified a demand for leasing in their 
customer base (E, F), others have not (C, D). Retailers C and G see a general market trend for leasing services, which they argue could 
positively influence this model in the future: 
“It’s like this monthly payment instead. And we’re seeing that more and more young people are buying solar cells. So I think we’re moving 
in that direction…” (Retailer G) 
To sum up, PV plant leasing is the latest solar model on the Swedish market and has so far only been adopted by one retailer. 
However, a significant share of the interviewees has considered, or is considering, to adopt it (A, C, E, F, G, H) – mostly because of 
perceived customer demand (environmental dimension) or vertical alignment with social goals. So far, however, horizontal, vertical, 
and environmental misalignment are creating very strong barriers to adoption as the model requires close customer interaction and 
complex juridical knowledge (horizontal dimension), a new service-oriented mindset (vertical dimension), and legal standards and 
financial partners that are not yet in place (environmental dimension). 
5. Discussion 
At an overall level, this study largely confirms the initial assumption that incumbents are more likely to pursue niche innovations 
that have a high degree of strategic fit However, in comparison with previous literature, the findings described in Section 4 provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the importance and influence of horizontal, vertical, and environmental alignment for solar model 
adoption by electricity retailers. In the following, we will highlight the most important insights in this regard. 
5.1. Horizontal alignment 
The combined analysis of the overall adoption pattern and the horizontal alignment shows that solar business models that are 
compatible with or complement the established electricity retailer business model are not generally preferred over those that are more 
different. Most notably, solar electricity sales, which as a whole is quite similar to the established electricity retail business model, is 
uncommon, whereas the turnkey turnkey sales model, which is different from the established model in all business model dimensions, 
has been adopted by a majority of retailers. This seems to contradict previous literature, which has argued that incumbents are likely to 
engage with business models that are compatible with their established ways of doing business (and vice versa) (cf. Bolton and 
Hannon, 2016; Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014; Wassermann et al., 2015). 
At closer scrutiny, however, our findings still suggest that horizontal alignment influences business model adoption. A key insight 
in this regard is that value proposition, customer interface, and downstream complementary assets, are not equally important as 
suggested in previous literature (e.g. Apajalahti et al., 2018; Bolton and Hannon, 2016; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Instead, the 
importance of horizontal alignment varies between business model dimensions. According to our study, the infrastructure dimension is 
the most important one for solar business model adoption. If a solar model has a low degree of fit in this dimension, retailers will either 
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(1) not adopt it at all, or they will (2) re-design it to improve its alignment with existing infrastructure. The first part of this argument is 
illustrated by the low adoption levels of solar electricity sales and PV plant leasing, which have complicated infrastructure dimensions 
that do not match the incumbent business model. The leasing example also supports the view that “competence-destroying” in-
novations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) are difficult for incumbents to handle. The second part of the argument is best illustrated by 
PV turnkey sales, where retailers configure the common turnkey model to be more compatible with their established business oper-
ations by outsourcing the installation (which is the most complex and incompatible part of this model). This confirms Schoettl and 
Lehmann-Ortega’s (2011) proposition that the installation aspect of PV turnkey sales is not compatible with retailers’ core compe-
tencies, but at the same time shows that retailers have found ways to reduce this misalignment – an option that has not been explicitly 
considered previously. 
Similarly, Swedish electricity retailers prefer community solar intermediation over traditional utility-led models, since outsourcing 
enables retailers to adopt the model with little additional requirements or consequence for the established infrastructure. 
In contrast, alignment in the value proposition dimension does not seem critical for retailers to adopt a solar business model. Not only 
does the limited adoption of the solar electricity sales model indicate that a close fit in this dimension is insufficient for adoption to 
occur, but there is also a widespread adoption of solar models that have a poorer fit with – or even threaten – the existing value of the 
retailers’ core business, such as PV turnkey sales. This is somewhat surprising, considering that this kind of “disruptive” (Christensen 
and Rosenbloom, 1995) solar innovation has been assumed to be particularly challenging for incumbent energy companies (cf. Bryant 
et al., 2018; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). 
The results related to customer interface and financial aspects are inconclusive. Regarding customer interface, retailers on the one 
hand seem to prefer solar models that allow them to keep contact with mass-market customers to a minimum (e.g. reimbursement) 
over models that require face-to-face interaction (e.g. community solar intermediation). On the other hand, there is widespread 
adoption of the PV turnkey sales model even though it requires specialized sales representatives who have intense customer contact. 
Regarding the financial aspects, retailers adopt solar models regardless of whether they imply monthly payments (high alignment with 
existing revenue streams) or one-time transactions (low alignment). However, cost structure alignment seems to be of some impor-
tance considering that pure retailing firms are less likely to adopt solar models in which the cost structure requires capital-investments. 
5.2. Vertical alignment 
The findings show that three main aspects of vertical alignment matter for solar model adoption. First, the overall organizational 
goals of the retailers influence their choice of specific business models. This is especially apparent for municipal energy companies, 
which not only have to consider economic goals but also social and environmental ones (Wihlborg and Palm, 2008). Indeed, our study 
shows that municipal ownership can be a major driving force for both PV turnkey sales and community solar intermediation. This is in 
line with previous studies from Germany (cf., e.g. Richter, 2013) but contradicts some recent writings that suggest that municipally 
owned energy companies tend to be unable to reorient and reorganize their business models due to local vested interests (cf. Mori, 
2021). 
Second, several retailers describe how their choice of specific solar models is influenced by how well those models align with the 
overall corporate business logic in terms of what kind of company they consider themselves to be and what types of products they should 
supply. This is especially visible in relation to PV plant leasing (and to some extent also PV turnkey sales), which require a service 
mindset to establish regular interaction with customers. As emphasized in the industrial marketing literature, such a “service-dominant 
logic” tends to clash with the traditional logic in that it requires new perspectives on, for example, value (co-)creation (Lusch and 
Nambisan, 2015; Vargo and Lusch, 2004). 
Third, the retailers consider how well new models fit their overall market strategy within retailing. With some individual firm ex-
ceptions, all solar models align well with establishing a sustainable brand supporting renewable energies. More importantly, however, 
the retailers use some solar business models – most notably premium reimbursement – to retain customers. While it has been 
acknowledged previously that customer retention can be a major driver for adopting solar business models in general (Funkhouser 
et al., 2015; Huijben and Verbong, 2013), our study shows that it can even be important enough to justify adopting inherently un-
profitable business models. 
5.3. Environmental alignment 
Our study confirms that the retailers’ choice of solar models is influenced by the models’ alignment with both the task environment 
and the institutional environment and provides a more detailed understanding of the importance of profitability, competition, market 
demand, availability of suppliers and partners, and regulation in this regard. 
Unsurprisingly, a perceived lack of profitability is one reason why retailers choose not to adopt some solar models, particularly 
community solar. However, most retailers also emphasize that they need to consider some solar models regardless of their lack of short- 
term profitability because of high competition in the industry. That is, retailers must offer the same models as their competitors in order 
to retain or increase their electricity retail market share and secure long-term overall profitability, which is especially prevalent with 
the premium reimbursement model. Solar model adoption, thus, seems to follow general industrial innovation patterns, where firms in 
an industry tend to imitate each other’s technology adoption behaviours in order to reduce the risk of losing their competitive position 
in the industry (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). 
There is also a direct effect of market demand on the choice of solar models, in that an articulated or assumed demand from the 
retailers’ established customer base can induce them to adopt a business model that is misaligned in other dimensions. This demand is 
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to some extent affected by economic policies favouring small PV systems over larger ones and thus host-ownership over community 
solar. This confirms findings from previous studies that technology-specific subsidies influence solar model adoption (Huijben et al., 
2016; Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017; Overholm, 2015). 
The availability of suppliers and partners also influences the retailers’ choice of solar models. On the one hand, limited availability of 
prosumers restricts the retailers’ ability to engage in solar electricity sales and the lack of partners with legal knowledge limits the 
adoption of PV plant leasing. On the other hand, the Swedish retailers’ choice of the PV turnkey sales model, where they outsource 
much of the key activities to external partners, has been facilitated by the already existing, well-developed Swedish ecosystem (or 
“industrial configuration” (cf. Strupeit and Palm, 2016) of solar installation firms (Bergek, 2020; Palm, 2015). This is in line with 
recent writings on business model innovation for sustainability, which suggest that ecosystems can provide important knowledge and 
complementary assets (Inigo et al., 2017). 
Finally, retailers describe that their decision to not (yet) adopt some solar models is highly influenced by uncertainties related to 
regulation, including rules for community solar, guarantees of origin for micro-producers (in relation to solar electricity sales), and 
general conditions for leasing. An interesting finding in this regard is that these regulations, in contrast to the subsidies mentioned 
above, for the most part are not technology-specific but concern more general issues such as taxation and forms of ownership. 
5.4. Strategic fit: the three dimensions combined 
The analysis shows that solar PV is not generally misaligned with the established business of incumbent energy companies, as 
suggested in some previous literature (Hess, 2016; Huijben and Verbong, 2013; Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014). Instead, the 
degree of strategic fit varies between solar business models, as a result of differences in horizontal, vertical, and environmental 
alignment. In this section, we highlight some of the key insights on the relative importance of the three strategic fit dimensions and 
how they relate to each other. 
One key observation in this regard is that we see little evidence that horizontal alignment drives solar model adoption, i.e. the 
retailers do not adopt particular solar models for the purpose of deliberately exploiting potential synergies between “sibling busi-
nesses” (cf. Wadström, 2019). Instead, a combination of vertical and environmental alignment is needed for retailers to consider 
adopting a particular solar model: it has to fit the retailers’ organizational goals or marketing strategies and allow them to respond to 
external threats or opportunities. With regard to vertical alignment, the findings suggest that at least one of the identified aspects 
(organizational goals, corporate business logic, or overall market strategy) have to be in favour of a solar model for it to be adopted. For 
example, the PV turnkey sales model does not align with the retailers’ main business logic – and even threatens their entire existence by 
turning customers into prosumers – but aligns well with the (social) organizational goals of municipal energy companies and most 
retailers’ sustainability-oriented market strategies. With regard to environmental alignment, the retailers stress the necessity of 
meeting the demand for different types of solar products and services from their existing customers (most notably solar electricity sales 
and PV turnkey sales) and matching the solar offers of their immediate rivals (i.e. other retailers) in order to retain their customers as 
major reasons to adopt some models (for instance in premium reimbursement), which indicates quite traditional task-related in-
centives and pressures. 
A second observation is that strong misalignment in one dimension can be enough for a solar model not to be widely adopted, even 
if there is alignment in other dimensions. This is the case for both solar electricity sales (which is restricted by the lack of solar 
electricity suppliers) and leasing (which would require an immense shift of business logic from selling electricity to becoming a service 
provider). 
A third observation is that retailers to some degree can manage strategic fit. Horizontal alignment can be achieved through 
adaptation of new business models to make them (more) compatible with the established model, while increasing vertical alignment 
might require rather time-intense, non-material investments in shifting corporate identity. Environmental alignment is dependent on 
external, dynamic factors and is, therefore, more difficult to manage by a single actor. Nevertheless, actors can to some extent influence 
factors such as customer demand and policy through collective efforts (Geels, 2014a). Previous efforts to increase alignment illustrate 
the interdependency between dimensions. A good example of this is the turnkey sales model, where a perceived lack of infrastructure 
alignment has resulted in a model in which some key activities are outsourced. This is enabled by environmental alignment in terms of 
available partners (solar installation firms) to outsource to. Another example is community solar. In previous literature, this has been 
described as the first choice for electric utilities (Funkhouser et al., 2015; Richter, 2013; Ruggiero and Lehkonen, 2017), because of its 
strong (assumed) alignment with the established retailer business model. However, the adapted community solar intermediation 
model that exists in Sweden has primarily been designed to allow the retailers to pursue their social mission (vertical alignment), 
which has resulted in weaker horizontal alignment because intermediation requires closer customer interaction than the traditional 
utility-led community solar model. Such interdependencies might explain why Swedish electricity retailers – in contrast to suggestions 
in previous literature (cf., e.g., Ruggiero and Lehkonen, 2017; Schoettl and Lehmann-Ortega, 2011) – as a collective engage less with 
the ‘utility-side’ community solar model and more with the ‘customer-side’ PV turnkey sales model. 
To sum up, these observations show that in order to explain solar business model adoption patterns, all the three strategic fit 
dimensions have to be considered together. Thus, in contrast to previous literature on solar PV, which has put forward horizontal 
alignment as the main explanation of incumbent actors’ business model choices, our study highlights the importance of also 
considering vertical and environmental alignment and the interplay between these dimensions. 
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6. Conclusions and implications 
The purpose of this paper was to further our understanding of the roles and strategies of incumbent actors with regard to emerging 
technologies. More specifically, the purpose was to identify and explore potential explanations for the business strategies of electric 
utility incumbents in relation to solar PV technology. In order to achieve this, we mapped the solar business models adopted by the 30 
largest Swedish electric utilities and analysed to what extent these models were strategically aligned with the incumbents’ established 
business model, corporate strategies, and external environment. 
The first research question concerned the characteristics of the solar business model adoption pattern of the incumbents. The 
mapping shows some common features across the industry in this regard: (1) most of the studied utilities have adopted one or more 
solar models, (2) some models (PV turnkey sales and premium reimbursement) have been widely adopted, while others (PV plant 
leasing) have hardly been adopted at all, and (3) archetypes have been tailored the Swedish context. 
The second research question concerned the importance of strategic fit for explaining the adoption pattern. Considering each of the 
dimensions individually, we find that (1) infrastructure (i.e. key resources, activities, and partnerships) has a higher influence on solar 
adoption than value proposition (horizontal alignment), (2) a solar business model must be aligned with the electric utility in-
cumbents’ overall organizational goals, main business logics, or market strategies (vertical alignment), and (3) competition, demand, 
policy, and availability of potential partners have a clear influence on utilities’ choice of solar business models (environmental 
alignment). This can be further nuanced looking at the interplay between the three dimensions. In contrast to previous literature, we 
find that horizontal alignment is not the main driver for solar model adoption. Instead, a model needs to fit a utility’s corporate strategy 
and allow it to respond to external threats or opportunities in order to be adopted. While strong misalignment in one of the three 
dimensions can hinder adoption, utilities have created ways to configure archetypical models to increase strategic fit, especially in the 
horizontal dimension. Moreover, empirical examples illustrate how re-configuration in one dimension can influence other dimensions. 
Overall, the findings highlight the relevance of the presented framework for analysing strategic fit. 
These findings contribute to the literature on industry incumbents’ strategies in relation to emerging technologies by demon-
strating that incumbents can and do engage with potentially disruptive business models. While our analysis focused on overall 
adoption patterns and explanations, there is also some indication that electric utilities make different decisions with regard to the 
adoption and design of solar business models, depending on a combination of firm-internal strategic considerations and external 
pressures. This nuances the view of industry incumbents as a homogenous collective governed by a common industry logic (Bidmon 
and Knab, 2018; Geels, 2014a). Thereby, it confirms earlier observations that incumbents do not necessarily share the same interests, 
goals, or preferences (Cherp et al., 2017; Heiskanen et al., 2018; Markard et al., 2016; Mühlemeier, 2019; Rosenbloom, 2019) and 
takes this line of reasoning one step further by investigating the importance of different types of strategic fit for explaining business 
model choices. 
Regarding further research, in-depth case studies of individual utilities could provide more detailed insights into the interplay 
between different strategic fit considerations and how they influence solar business model adoption and the configuration of specific 
models at the company level. Moreover, longitudinal industry-level studies of business model experimentation by incumbents (and 
other actors) could further our understanding of how the relative importance of strategic fit dimensions changes over time. 
Finally, the study raises some questions about the role of incumbent actors for innovation diffusion. Most notably, it shows that 
Swedish electric utilities do not only contribute to solar PV diffusion through their own investments in PV systems, but also through 
exploring new roles as brokers in PV turnkey sales and community solar intermediation. Further research about these roles could 
contribute to the expanding literature on diffusion (or “user-side”) and transition intermediaries (Barnes, 2019; Bergek, 2020; Glaa and 
Mignon, 2020; Kivimaa et al., 2020). The Swedish ‘sales only’ model for PV turnkey systems is especially interesting in this regard as it 
introduces a second-tier intermediary role in what appears to be an already quite well-functioning business model controlled by 
specialized solar installation firms. However, while incumbent actors can be of crucial importance for innovation development and 
diffusion (Bidmon and Knab, 2018; Geels, 2010; Heiskanen et al., 2018; Pinkse and den Buuse, 2012; Smith et al., 2010) some authors 
seem concerned that incumbents can ‘dilute’ the energy transition by moving emerging fields towards business models that are more in 
line with their current strategies (Apajalahti et al., 2018). Thus, future studies would be needed to investigate what influence the 
business model choices of electricity retailers will have, eventually, on the overall diffusion of solar PV in Sweden and elsewhere. 
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